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Abstract. [Context & Motivation] In many domains such as healthcare and
banking, IT systems need to fulfill various requirements related to security. The
elaboration of security requirements for a given system is in part guided by the
controls envisaged by the applicable security standards and best practices. [Prob-
lem] An important difficulty that analysts have to contend with during security
requirements elaboration is sifting through a large number of security controls
and determining which ones have a bearing on the security requirements for a
given system. This challenge is often exacerbated by the scarce security exper-
tise available in most organizations. [Principal ideas/results] In this paper, we
develop automated decision support for the identification of security controls that
are relevant to a specific system in a particular context. Our approach, which is
based on machine learning, leverages historical data from security assessments
performed over past systems in order to recommend security controls for a new
system. We operationalize and empirically evaluate our approach using real his-
torical data from the banking domain. Our results show that, when one excludes
security controls that are rare in the historical data, our approach has an average
recall of≈ 95% and average precision of≈ 67%. [Contribution] The high recall
– indicating only a few relevant security controls are missed – combined with
the reasonable level of precision – indicating that the effort required to confirm
recommendations is not excessive – suggests that our approach is a useful aid to
analysts for more efficiently identifying the relevant security controls, and also
for decreasing the likelihood that important controls would be overlooked.
Keywords: Security Requirements Engineering, Security Assessment, Machine
Learning
1 Introduction
Many IT systems, e.g., those used in the healthcare and finance sectors, need to meet
a variety of security requirements in order to protect against attacks. The elaboration
of these requirements is heavily influenced by the security controls prescribed by stan-
dards and best practices such as the ISO 27000 family of standards [14], NIST SP 800
guidelines [24], and OSA security patterns [25]. These controls define a wide range of
technical and administrative measures for the avoidance, detection and mitigation of
security risks [10]. An example security control from ISO 27002 is: “The integrity of
information being made available on a publicly available system should be protected to
prevent unauthorized modification.” If an application has information assets with public
access points, this control may be elaborated into detailed security requirements aimed
at avoiding information tampering.
For a specific IT system in a particular context, only a subset of the controls in
the security standards and best practices have a bearing on the security requirements.
An important task that analysts need to do is therefore to decide which controls are
relevant and need to be considered during requirements elaboration. Since the controls
are numerous, performing this task entirely manually is not only cumbersome but also
error-prone, noting that deciding whether a certain control is relevant often correlates
with several contextual factors, e.g., the assets that are associated with a given system,
the threats that the system is exposed to, and the vulnerabilities that the system leads
to. Overlooking any of these factors can lead to wrong decisions about the security
controls, and potentially serious consequences. This problem is made even more acute
by the scarcity of expertise in security risk analysis in most organizations.
Our work in this paper is motivated by the need to provide automated decision
support for identifying the security controls that are pertinent to a specific system. To
this end, we observe that, in security-critical sectors, e.g., finance, security assessment
is an increasingly systematic activity, where security assessment data is collected and
recorded in a structured way [7]. Many system providers and security consulting firms
now have detailed data models in place to keep track of the security-related properties
of the systems that they analyze and the decisions they make regarding security. This
raises the prospect that existing (historical) data about security assessments can be put
to productive use for decision support. What we do in this paper is to examine the
feasibility and effectiveness of this prospect in a real setting.
The starting point for our work was a year-long field study at a major international
bank. Our study aimed at developing insights into industry practices for assessing IT
security risks. The study focused specifically on early-stage security assessments during
the system inception and requirements elaboration phases. This study led to a precise
characterization of the historical data that we had at our disposal for building automated
decision support. While the data model resulting from our field study inevitably has
bespoke concepts that are specific to our study context, the majority of the concepts
are general and aligned with widely used standards, particularly ISO 27001 and 27002.
This helps provide confidence that our data model is representative of a wider set of
security practices than our immediate study context.
With a data model for security assessments at hand, we explore the use of several
Machine Learning (ML) algorithms for identifying the security controls that are most
relevant to a given system and context. To this end, we define a set of features for learn-
ing from historical security assessment data. We empirically evaluate the accuracy of
our approach using real data. Our results show that, when one excludes security con-
trols that are rare, i.e., apply to too few systems in the historical data, our approach on
average has a recall of ≈ 95% and precision of ≈ 67%. Since recall is high and the
number of false positives is not excessive, as suggested by precision, we conclude that
ML is a promising avenue for increasing the efficiency of identifying relevant security
controls, and also reducing the likelihood that important controls would be missed. In
situations where one has to deal with rarely used security controls, ML alone is not suf-
ficient; this necessitates future investigations into how ML can be complemented with
other techniques, e.g., guided manual reviews, expert rules and case-based reasoning,
in order to provide comprehensive coverage of the security controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides background and
compares with related work. Section 3 summarizes the outcomes of our field study
on security assessment. Section 4 presents our ML-based approach for recommending
relevant security controls. Sections 5 and 6 report on our evaluation. Section 7 discusses
threats to validity. Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
This section discusses the industry standards and the existing research strands related
to our work.
2.1 Information Security Standards
Our collaborating partner has its IT security practices grounded in the ISO 27000 fam-
ily of information security standards [14]. This commonly used series of standards pro-
vides a systematic approach for handling information security. Among these standards,
ISO 27001 and 27002 relate most closely to our work in this paper. ISO 27001 speci-
fies a set of requirements for developing and maintaining an information security man-
agement system. The standard further envisages requirements for the assessment and
control of the security risks posed by security breaches in IT systems. ISO 27002 com-
plements ISO 27001 by providing guidelines for selecting, implementing, and manag-
ing controls for security risks. The standard has a total of 128 security controls. These
controls span 11 security categories, e.g., security policy, asset management, and access
control. When elaborating the security requirements for a system, one has to identify
the controls that are relevant to the system at hand. As noted earlier, performing this
task without automated assistance is both tedious and prone to errors. Our work in this
paper takes aim at providing suitable automated support for the above task.
2.2 Security Requirements Engineering
Security requirements have been widely studied for IT systems, e.g., [6, 12, 32, 30, 16,
19, 22]. The most closely related research threads to our work are those concerned with
early-stage security risk analysis. Two notable techniques to this end are STRIDE and
DREAD, both originating from Microsoft [20]. These techniques have been used and
improved by many corporations over the years [22]. STRIDE is a method for classify-
ing security threats, whereas DREAD is a method to rate, compare and prioritize the
severity of the risks presented by each of the threats classified using STRIDE. Our work
is complementary to STRIDE and DREAD, first in that we focus on risk mitigation as
opposed to risk classification and triage, and second in that we take an automation angle
rather than dealing exclusively with manual security analysis.
Some prior research attempts to assist security engineers through capturing domain
expertise in a reusable form. For example, Schmitt and Liggesmeyer [29] propose a
model for structuring security knowledge as a way to improve the efficiency of speci-
fying and analyzing security requirements. Sindre and Opdahl [31] develop a system-
atic approach for security requirements elicitation based on use cases, with a focus on
reusable methodological guidelines. In contrast to the above work, we explore how his-
torical data from past security assessments can be mined and reused within a corporate
context for building automated decision support. We further demonstrate the effective-
ness of our approach through systematic empirical means by applying the approach to
an industrial case study.
2.3 Applications of Machine Learning in Requirements Engineering
ML has generated a lot of traction in Requirements Engineering for supporting a va-
riety of tasks, e.g., extracting user-story information [28], identifying non-functional
requirements [3], and requirements classification [17]. To the best of our knowledge,
we are the first to attempt applying ML for generating automated recommendations for
security controls using historical data.
3 Field Study on Security Assessment
This section describes the results of a field study conducted with the goal of building
insights into how IT security assessments are done in practice. We started our study
with meetings with IT security specialists at our collaborating partner (a bank). Subse-
quently, the first author spent approximately a year onsite at the partner’s headquarters,
learning about the details of the security assessment process followed there and the data
model that underlies this process.
The security assessment process at our partner is a customized procedure shaped
around the guidelines of the ISO 27000 standards [14]. A central goal of this process is
to derive, for a given system, a set of ISO-specified controls that need to be elaborated
further into security requirements.
In Figure 1(a), we show an overview of the security assessment process gleaned
from our field study, and in Figure 1(b) – a (simplified) version of the underlying data
model. While we present the security assessment process in a sequential manner, in
practice, the process is iterative. This means that before they are finalized, the choices
and the decisions made during assessment may undergo multiple rounds of improve-
ment based on the findings at the different steps of the process. The data model of
Figure 1(b) is populated incrementally as the assessment workflow unfolds, with each
step of the workflow adding new information. As we describe in Section 4, we use this
data model as the basis for defining features for learning from past security assessment
records.
As shown in Figure 1(a), security assessment starts with the “create project” step.
A new project represents a system-to-be that is at the inception and requirements gath-
ering stage. In this step, the basic information about a project is specified, e.g., project
Projectcreateproject
choose
assets
Assets
create assessment
Threats Vulnerabilities Controls
choose
threats
choose
vulnerabilities
choose
controls
Project
Assessment
Assessment
determine
criticality Project
Assessment Assessment
w/ assets
w/ assets
& criticality
w/ threats w/ threats
& vulnerabilities
w/ threats
& vulnerabilities
& controls
· · ·<latexit sha1_base64="x6yPwvpb+4Sc+Wclac0E9LBE+pg=">AAACYXicZZDNSgMxFIVvx//xr+rST bEbcVFmBHElFqWgOwVbhaZIJnOnRmeSIUn9CwM+glt9IZ/BtS9iphVh9GxyObnn43CjPOXaBMFnzZuanpmdm1/wF5eWV1bra+s9LUeKYZfJVKqriGpMucCu4SbFq1whzaIUL6O74/L/8h6V5lJcmKccBxkdCp5wR o2zeoTF0ujrejNoBWM1/g/hz9A8/PAPXgDg7Hqt1iGxZKMMhWEp1brPpEhQoWA4sKedTscoKgqfjDTmlN3RIdpx14rVz+PE4OPADhXNbzh7rAZGKq0aVCn6VPg+EfjAZJZREVuCKZYtin44sJYkUhohDWr+jMSxjU 5sMyyKohrKuOBl8DclTJmwe4UNCr/RIO6gyEzpVylVjHY7MudsjCH32hXFHdvadWCSU0WE5CJ25ewYwt0bJRoVR92Y4Nzhw79n/j/0dlth0ArPg2b7CCaah03Ygm0IYR/acAJn0AUGt/AKb/Be+/IWvLq3Pln1aj +ZDajI2/wGAwK96A==</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jS7kBmhCdb8M//cejwo5CFLDRNY=">AAACYXicZZDNSgMxFIXT8X/8a3Xpp tiNuCgzgrgSRSnoTsHWQlMkk7lTozNJSFJtDfMObnXrw/gI4toXMdOKMHo2uZzc83G4kUyZNkHwWfFmZufmFxaX/OWV1bX1am2jo8VQUWhTkQrVjYiGlHFoG2ZS6EoFJItSuI7uT4v/6wdQmgl+ZcYS+hkZcJYwS oyzOpjGwuibaiNoBhPV/w/hz9A4evcP5duHf3FTq7RwLOgwA25oSrTuUcETUMAp9O15q9UyivDcx0MNktB7MgA76VqyejJODIz6dqCIvGV0VA4MVVo2iFJknPs+5vBIRZYRHlsMKRQt8l7YtxYnQhguDGj2BNixjU 5sI8zzvBzKGGdF8DfFTZGw+7kNcr9ex+6gQE3hlylljHY7QjI6weAH7YrCrm3uOTCWRGEuGI9dOTuBMPdGiQbFQNenOHf48O+Z/w+dvWYYNMPLoHF8gqZaRFtoG+2gEB2gY3SGLlAbUXSHntELeq18eUte1duYrn qVn8wmKsnb+gadIb9c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="jS7kBmhCdb8M//cejwo5CFLDRNY=">AAACYXicZZDNSgMxFIXT8X/8a3Xpp tiNuCgzgrgSRSnoTsHWQlMkk7lTozNJSFJtDfMObnXrw/gI4toXMdOKMHo2uZzc83G4kUyZNkHwWfFmZufmFxaX/OWV1bX1am2jo8VQUWhTkQrVjYiGlHFoG2ZS6EoFJItSuI7uT4v/6wdQmgl+ZcYS+hkZcJYwS oyzOpjGwuibaiNoBhPV/w/hz9A4evcP5duHf3FTq7RwLOgwA25oSrTuUcETUMAp9O15q9UyivDcx0MNktB7MgA76VqyejJODIz6dqCIvGV0VA4MVVo2iFJknPs+5vBIRZYRHlsMKRQt8l7YtxYnQhguDGj2BNixjU 5sI8zzvBzKGGdF8DfFTZGw+7kNcr9ex+6gQE3hlylljHY7QjI6weAH7YrCrm3uOTCWRGEuGI9dOTuBMPdGiQbFQNenOHf48O+Z/w+dvWYYNMPLoHF8gqZaRFtoG+2gEB2gY3SGLlAbUXSHntELeq18eUte1duYrn qVn8wmKsnb+gadIb9c</latexit><latexit sha1_base64="G3nC+/2CTw+T98ponODx41F+ek0=">AAACYXicZZHNSsNAFIWn8a+Nf21du ilmIy5KIojbohR0V8FWoRNkMrmpo8lMmJlqdcg7uNU3c+2LOGmLEHs3czlzz8fh3ihPmdK+/11z1tY3NrfqDXd7Z3dvv9lqj5SYSgpDKlIh7yOiIGUchprpFO5zCSSLUriLni/L/7sXkIoJfqvfcggzMuEsYZRoK 40wjYVWD03P7/rz6qw2wbLx0LIGD61aH8eCTjPgmqZEqTEVPAEJnEJorvv9vpaEFy6eKsgJfSYTMPOsFWmcx4mGWWgmkuSPjM6qhqlMqwKRkrwVros5vFKRZYTHBkMKZYpiHITG4EQIzYUGxd4BW7ZWifGCoiiqpo xxVhr/XFyXDnNWGL9wOx1sFwpUl3qVUsUoOyNyRucY/KJsUDgx3VMLxjmRmAvGYxvOzCHMvlGiQDJQnQXOLj74v+bVZnTaDfxucON7vYvlCeroEB2hYxSgc9RDV2iAhoiiJ/SBPtFX7cdpOE2nvRh1akvPAaqUc/ gLwsi8Gw==</latexit>
(a) Security assessment process
Asset
name 
description 
criticality  
data type 
confidentiality  
capability 
volume    
user
Assessment
name
concerns◀* *
Project
name  
description    
type        
criticality 
business domain
* *
Threat
description 
impact         
risk level
identifies▶︎1 *
Control
ISO label
Vulnerability
description
exploits▲*
1
counters▶︎* 1
*1
(b) Data model
Fig. 1. Main outcomes of our field study; note that the outcomes have been scoped to the analyti-
cal task pursued in this paper (i.e., decision support for security controls).
description and business domain. Next and in the “choose assets” step, the analysts de-
fine and link the assets relevant to a given project. In general, an asset can be defined as
a resource with economic value that is held or controlled by an individual, corporation,
or country [13]. The step is followed by the “determine criticality” step where the an-
alysts, in collaboration with the business stakeholders, decide about project criticality.
The more critical a project is, the more is the need to evaluate potential threats and vul-
nerabilities systematically. To evaluate the criticality of a project, the analysts fill out a
security questionnaire comprised of 12 multiple-choice questions. Each question covers
a possible aspect of exposure, e.g., the level of exposure to external attacks. Once the
questionnaire has been completed, the analysts exercise expert judgment to decide the
project criticality level and update the project information accordingly.
The “create assessment” step captures various contextual information about the as-
sets that have been linked to a project. The (data) type of an asset is determined by the
content that the asset stores, processes, or transfers. The classification of asset types at
our partner is based on their in-house domain expertise and the guidelines of the na-
tional data protection authority. The confidentiality of an asset is determined by how
sensitive its content is. This attribute is a value on an (ordinal) scale ranging from pub-
lic to secret. The criticality of an asset is a quantitative score indicating risk exposure.
This score determines whether the potential risk posed by an asset is significant enough
to warrant additional security analysis. The score is derived from the following asset
attributes through a combination of expert judgment and rules: (1) the capability at-
tribute, capturing the output channels to which the content of an asset can be sent,
(2) the volume attribute, capturing the volume of data that an individual transaction can
read, write, or delete from an asset, and (3) the user attribute, estimating in a logarith-
mic scale the number of users that can access an asset. We note that for an individual
project, our partner may conduct multiple assessments from different perspectives and
involving different groups of analysts. In this paper, when we refer to an assessment, we
mean the collection of all assessment activities performed over a given project. Conse-
quently, the assessment information collected per project is the union of the outcomes
of all the assessment activities performed.
Once the contextual information for the assets in a project has been specified, the an-
alysts move on to the identification of threats and vulnerabilities, and subsequently, the
security controls. A threat refers to anything that has the potential to cause serious harm
to a system, e.g., unauthorized disclosure of confidential information [13]. Threats are
identified in the “choose threats” step of the process of Figure 1(a). In this step, the an-
alysts carefully examine a threat catalog consisting of 22 threat items and decide which
ones are applicable. If a threat is deemed applicable to a project, the analysts qualify
the threat more precisely within the context of that project. Specifically, for each ap-
plicable threat, the analysts provide a description, choose an appropriate risk level, and
determine whether the threat impacts confidentiality, integrity, availability, or traceabil-
ity. Next, in the “choose vulnerabilities” step, the analysts decide about the applicable
vulnerabilities. A vulnerability represents a weakness that can be exploited by a threat,
leading to the risk of asset damage or exposure [13]. An example vulnerability would
be “oversight in defining access control rules to shared information”. At our partner,
vulnerabilities are identified using a pre-defined catalog with 156 entries. This catalog
encompasses all the vulnerabilities known to the partner in its application domain.
Finally, in the “choose controls” step, the analysts select the appropriate security
controls for the project being assessed. The source for the security controls at our part-
ner is the ISO 27002 standard [13]. We thus refer to these controls as ISO controls. The
catalog of ISO controls used by our partner constitutes 134 entries. In the remainder
of this paper, we develop and evaluate automated decision support for choosing ISO
controls. In particular, assuming that the assessment process steps prior to choosing the
controls have been already performed for a project, we propose an approach based on
ML for recommending the ISO controls relevant to the project.
Before we move on to presenting our approach, it is important to note that, for
simplicity and succinctness, we have scoped the security assessment process and data
model in Figure 1 to what is needed for recommending ISO controls. In particular, we
have left out of this figure and our explanation thereof a number of activities, e.g., risk
mitigation and residual risk analysis, which take place after ISO-control selection.
4 Approach
Our approach for recommending ISO controls is based on ML. In this section, we
present the main principles and considerations behind the approach.
4.1 Source Data for Building a Classification Model
To build a classification model, we utilize the database of historical assessment records
at our collaborating partner. This database covers all the systems assessed by the partner
in the past nine years. From this database, we extract various attributes. Our attributes,
which are based on the data model of Figure 1(b), are discussed next.
4.2 Machine Learning Features
We engineered our features for learning through a joint endeavor with the IT security
specialists at our partner. Table 1 presents our feature set alongside our intuition as
to why each feature may be a useful indicator for the relevance of ISO controls. Es-
sentially, we chose a feature for inclusion in the set if we deemed the feature to be
characterizing an important aspect of security assessment. For instance and as shown in
Table 1, the criticality attribute of a project is used as a feature. In contrast, the name
attribute of a project is not, since the name has no impact on the identification of ISO
controls. The ISO controls (not shown in the table) are treated as class attributes. We
build one classifier per ISO control. The class attribute for each ISO control is thus a
binary value indicating whether or not the control is relevant to a given project.
4.3 Dealing with Imbalance
An important issue we have to take account of in our approach is imbalance in our
security assessment data. In particular, we observe that the absence of ISO controls is
much more prevalent than their presence across the projects. This imbalance is caused
by the relatively infrequent use of several ISO controls. When a class – in our context,
a particular ISO control being applicable – is rare, ML classification models have a
tendency to predict the more prevalent classes [1]. In our context, this means that, unless
steps are taken to counter imbalance for rarely used ISO controls, any classification
model that we build may invariably find the rare ISO controls inapplicable. To tackle
imbalance, we examine two commonly used methods, namely synthetic minority over-
sampling technique (SMOTE) [4] and cost-sensitive learning (CSL) [8].
4.4 Choice of Classification Algorithm
We elect to use interpretable ML techniques to provide analysts not only with security
control recommendations, but also the rationale behind how the security controls were
selected. An interpretable model would explain how and why a specific decision was
made concerning a particular security control. For instance, the model would indicate
that a particular ISO control is selected mostly because a certain combination of threats
and vulnerabilities is present. We note that, in this paper, we do not attempt to validate
the resulting ML models with domain experts. Nevertheless, scoping our work to in-
terpretable ML is important, because experts are unlikely to accept decisions for which
they are not provided an explanation.
Table 1. Our features for machine learning.
Feature (D) Definition and (I) Intuition
Project type (D) The type of a project (total of 3 types: usual business, large scale and integration project).
(I) Each project type implies a different scale and a specific process for handling risks.
Project
criticality
(D) The criticality of a project (total of 3 levels: very critical, critical, and non-critical).
(I) The more critical a project, the more stringent are the security controls.
Business
domain
(D) The area of business under which a project falls (total of 48 domains, e.g., web banking,
wealth management). (I) The feature relates to how severe the consequences of a breach
are. For example, a breach may have more severe implications in wealth management than
in certain other domains due to the involvement of vital client information.
Business
domain
category
(D) The category for a group of business domains (total of 4 categories, e.g., the HR cate-
gory, which encompasses all the human-resource-related business domains). (I) The feature
provides an extra layer of abstraction for distinguishing different business domains.
Security
answers
(A1..A12)
(D) The answers provided by the analysts to the questions on a static security questionnaire
(total of 12 questions). An example question is: “What is the project’s level of exposure to
external attacks?” All answers are on a three-point scale: low, significant, very high. (I) The
answers serve as an indicator for the seriousness of potential security breaches.
Number of
assets
(D) The number of assets linked to a project. (I) Increasing the number of assets may lead
to an increased attack surface, thus warranting more rigorous controls.
Number of
critical assets
(D) The number of critical assets in a project. (I) Critical assets are specific entities with
major importance. If these assets are compromised, the effects are more serious than those
for regular assets. Critical assets may necessitate more security controls.
Number of
assets per
category
(C1..C9)
(D) The number of assets in an asset category (total of 9 categories, e.g., mobile applica-
tion or database). (I) Each asset category has a different impact on the security controls in
a project. For example, a client database being compromised would typically have more
serious consequences than, say, a mobile application being inaccessible.
Number of
users
(D) The maximum number of users who can access the data of a project. (I) The potential
risk of data exposure is correlated to the number of users accessing the data.
Data type (D) The most sensitive type of data in an asset (total of 4 types, e.g., personal data). (I) The
more sensitive the data, the more impact a breach would have.
Capability (D) The capability of extracting data (total of 3 modes: screen, print, and electronic). Screen
means that a user can view the data on a screen. Print means that a user can print the data
on paper. Electronic means that a user can store the data onto an electronic device. (I) Data
exposure risks increase as one goes from screen to print to electronic data extraction. The
security controls required may thus be impacted by the extraction capability.
Volume (D) The volume of data that can be read, written, or deleted by one data transaction (total of
3 types: record-by-record, percentage-per-day, and unlimited). Record-by-record means that
a user can access only one record at a time. Percentage-per-day means that a user can access
a certain percentage of the dataset in one day. Unlimited means that a user has unlimited
access. (I) The risk of data exposure correlates with volume. Volume may thus have an
influence on the security controls.
Confidentiality (D) The maximum confidentiality level of the assets in a project (total of 4 levels: public,
restricted, confidential, secret). (I) The higher the confidentiality level, the more severe are
the consequences of a breach. The security controls may thus be influenced by the level of
confidentiality.
Threats
(T1..T22)
(D) The presence or absence of a threat (total of 22 threats). (I) Threats exploits vulnerabil-
ities. The presence of a threat has a direct influence on the security assessment decisions,
including those related to the security controls.
Threat impact
(S1..S4)
(D) Impact scores based on all the threats in a project. Separate scores are computed for
confidentiality (S1), integrity (S2), availability (S3), and traceability (S4). (I) The scores
relate to the impact of security breaches and thus may influence the controls.
Risk
(R1..R22)
(D) Estimated risk of each threat on a scale of 1-8 (negligible to extremely high). (I) The risk
posed by a threat influences security decisions, including those about the security controls.
Vulnerability
(V1..V154)
(D) The presence or absence of a vulnerability (total of 154 vulnerabilities). (I) Security
controls counter vulnerabilities, and are naturally affected by which vulnerabilities apply.
5 Case Study
We evaluate our approach through an industrial case study from the banking domain.
The case study is a follow-on to our field study of Section 3 and was conducted with
the same industry partner.
5.1 Research Questions
Our case study aims to answer the following research questions (RQs):
RQ1 (classification): Which classification algorithm is the most accurate at recom-
mending security controls? The accuracy of our approach is partly driven by the se-
lected ML algorithm. In RQ1, we examine standard classification algorithms based on
the existing best practices in the literature [23], and compare the accuracy of the result-
ing classifiers.
RQ2 (features): Which features are the most influential for recommending security
controls? Features used in constructing an ML-based classifier typically have different
degrees of importance toward the classifier’s decision making. In RQ2, we evaluate the
importance of the features in Table 1.
RQ3 (usefulness): What is the overall utility of our approach? For our approach to
be useful in practice, the decision support must propose sufficiently accurate security
controls in practical time. RQ3 measures the accuracy of our security recommendation
system at the level of projects alongside the execution time of the main steps of our
approach.
5.2 Implementation
Our recommendation system is built using the Weka framework [11]. Weka supports
a broad spectrum of ML techniques. We ran our experiments on a computer equipped
with an Intel i7 CPU with 16GB of memory.
5.3 Case Study Data
Our raw data is a database of 274 assessment projects conducted over a span of nine
years, from 2009 until present. Of these assessment projects, we excluded 47 because
they either were not carried through to completion, or were built for testing and training
purposes. This leaves us with 227 assessment projects for evaluating our approach.
Among the controls introduced by ISO 27002, some never or too rarely appear in
our data. Based on our ML expertise and feedback from security engineers, we excluded
the ISO controls that had been used less than 5 times within the selected 227 assessment
projects. The applicability of such ISO controls cannot be predicted meaningfully using
ML. In summary, our experimental dataset provides values for all the features in Table 1
and 77 ISO controls across 227 assessment projects.
5.4 Experimental Setup
To answer the RQs in Section 5.1, we performed three experiments, EXPI, EXPII and
EXPIII, as described below.
EXPI. This experiment answers RQ1. We select the following interpretable ML al-
gorithms as candidates for building our recommendation system: Naive Bayes [15],
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Fig. 2. 10-fold validation for all ISO-control classifiers.
Logistic Regression [18], J48 [27], CART [2], JRip [5], and PART [9]. EXPI compares
the accuracy of these six alternatives using the features of Table 1.
We start EXPI with hyper-parameter optimization (HPO) for the six alternatives
considered. In doing so, we also account for the data imbalance problem described
in Section 4.3. As noted in this earlier section, we consider two techniques for han-
dling imbalance: SMOTE and CSL. SMOTE resolves imbalance by adding new artifi-
cial (synthetic) minority samples to the dataset. CSL mitigates the bias of the classifier
toward the majority class by assigning a larger penalty to either false positives or false
negatives. In our context, we levy a larger penalty on false negatives, i.e., ISO controls
that apply to a project but are erroneously classified as not relevant. The proportional
prevalence of the majority versus the minority (rare) class in our experimental dataset
rounds up to 12 to 1. Specifically, our dataset contains 17952 instances of the majority
and 1548 instances of the minority class. We use the same ratio for CSL by setting the
cost values of false negatives and false positives to 12 and 1, respectively. Note that the
cost values of true positives and true negatives are zero.
For HPO, we use a step-wise grid search algorithm [21] that starts with a first coarse
grid search and then refines the areas of good accuracy with additional finer-grained
grid searches. For example, to find an optimal value of a real-type hyper-parameter,
at the first search iteration, i = 1, we vary the parameter value within the valid range
of the parameter by si = 0.1 step width. After finding the best parameter value, bi,
at the first search iteration, we adjust the step width, si+1, by si × 0.1 (e.g., 0.01 at
the second iteration) and adjust the search range for the parameter to [bi− si,bi + si]
for the next iteration. We continue the iterations until the difference between the best
accuracy values found at the ith and i− 1th iterations are less than 0.01. Note that our
HPO searches all the possible values in the valid ranges of the integer- and enum-type
parameters at the first iteration, and then uses the best-found values at the subsequent
iterations for tuning real-type parameters.
Following HPO, we measure through cross validation the accuracy of the alternative
ML algorithms for predicting ISO controls. The cross validation process is illustrated
in Figure 2. The “repeat 10 times” block in the figure applies standard 10-fold cross
validation [23] to the classifier built for an individual ISO control. This is repeated for
all the ISO controls through the “repeat for all ISO controls” block. At the end, the
“compute metrics” step calculates the EXPI accuracy metrics described in Section 5.5.
EXPII. This experiment answers RQ2. We evaluate the importance of the features in
Table 1 based on the best-found configuration in RQ1. For each of the ISO-control
classifiers, we rank the features using a standard metric for feature evaluation, as we
discuss in Section 5.5. We then identify and aggregate the most influential features
across all the ISO controls.
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Fig. 3. Leave-one-out validation for all projects.
EXPIII. This experiment answers RQ3 by examining how much useful assistance one
can expect from ML for identifying the ISO controls relevant to a given assessment
project. Specifically, EXPIII performs the leave-one-out validation process shown in
Figure 3. The “leave one project out” step takes one project out from the dataset. The
remaining dataset is then utilized for training the classifiers of all the ISO controls.
Subsequently, the withheld project is used for testing the trained classifiers, as shown
in “repeat for all ISO controls” block of the figure. This is repeated for all the projects
in the dataset, as indicated by the “repeat for all projects” block. At the end of the
process, we compute the EXPIII accuracy metrics described in Section 5.5. We note
that these accuracy metrics are only indicative of in-vivo usefulness; the metrics have
to be considered in their application context for a more definitive evaluation. Doing so
requires user studies and is beyond the scope of this current paper.
5.5 Metrics
In EXPI, for a given ISO control c, we define the precision and recall metrics as follows:
(1) precision Pc = TP/(TP+FP) and (2) recall Rc = TP/(TP+FN), where TP, FP, and
FN are the sum of the true positives, false positives, and false negatives, respectively,
across the 10 folds of cross validation for ISO control c. A true positive is a project
to which c is relevant and is correctly predicted as such; a false positive is a project to
which c is not relevant but is incorrectly predicted to have c as a control; a false negative
is a project to which c is relevant but is incorrectly predicted to not have c as a control.
These metrics are used for comparing the accuracy of different ML algorithms.
In practice, the decision as to whether an ISO control is applicable should be made
as simple as possible to minimize the effort needed from the analysts. The most crit-
ical factor here is recall, since the presence of false negatives implies that important
ISO controls may be missed. A recall that is too low would thus undermine the useful-
ness of the approach, meaning that the analysts would be better off doing the selection
of the relevant controls entirely manually. To allow the analysts to focus only on the
recommended controls, we prioritize recall over precision.
In EXPII, we use the gain ratio metric [26]. This metric, which is commonly used
for ranking ML features, is a modification of the information gain metric, aimed at
reducing bias on multi-valued features.
In EXPIII, we define precision and recall around a project. This is in contrast to
EXPI, where these notions were defined around an ISO control. Let p be the project
withheld from the set of all projects in a given round of leave-one-out validation. We
define (1) precision Pp as TP/(TP+FP) and (2) recall Rp as TP/(TP+FN), where
TP is the number of relevant ISO controls correctly predicted as such for project p,
FP is the number of ISO controls that are not relevant to project p but are incorrectly
predicted as being relevant, and FN is the number of relevant ISO controls incorrectly
predicted as not being relevant to project p. These precision and recall metrics are used
for measuring overall accuracy at a project level.
6 Results
In this section, we answer the RQs of Section 5.1 based on the results of our case study.
6.1 RQ1
Table 2 shows the results of EXPI, described in Section 5.4. Specifically, the table re-
ports the average precision and recall – average Pc and Rc, defined in Section 5.5, across
all ISO controls – of the six alternative ML classification algorithms considered.
As we argued previously, in our application context, recall has priority over preci-
sion. The results of Table 2 thus clearly suggest that J48, which yields an average recall
of 94.95% and average precision of 65.90%, is the best choice among the ML classifi-
cation algorithm considered. For all classification algorithms, including J48, handling
imbalance via CSL leads to substantially more accurate classification, when compared
to doing so via SMOTE. When J48 is applied alongside CSL with a cost ratio of 12 to 1
for false negatives versus false positives (see Section 5.4), the optimal hyper-parameters
are as follows: pruning confidence=0.001 and minimal number of instances per leaf=7.
Table 2. Comparison of the average precision and recall of different ML classification algorithms
with optimized hyper-parameters.
Algorithm CSL SMOTE
Pc (avg.) Rc (avg.) Pc (avg.) Rc (avg.)
J48 65.90 94.95 77.11 78.15
CART 55.11 92.42 76.03 64.20
JRip 64.32 91.35 74.68 79.49
PART 69.19 92.89 73.63 76.74
Logistic regression 64.32 51.54 68.77 58.91
Naive Bayes 33.35 61.59 17.02 50.93
The answer to RQ1 is that J48 combined with CSL leads to the most accurate classifi-
cation. Using this combination, we obtained an average recall of 94.95% and average
precision of 65.90% in our case study.
We answer RQ2 and RQ3 using J48, CSL, and the best hyper-parameter values men-
tioned above.
6.2 RQ2
As explained in EXPII of Section 5.4, we use gain ratio for estimating the importance
of our features (Table 1). Based on the gain-ratio scores of the features across all the
ISO-control classifiers, we make the following observations:
1. There are 12 vulnerabilities that have a zero gain ratio in all the classifiers. A subse-
quent investigation revealed that the vulnerabilities in question are not present in any
of the past projects. We excluded these vulnerabilities from the dataset. The impact
of this exclusion on precision and recall is negligible.
2. With the above 12 vulnerabilities removed, we observed that different ISO-control
classifiers use different but overlapping subsets of features. This indicates that the de-
cision about the relevance of different ISO controls is influenced by different factors.
The feature subsets were picked automatically by J48’s internal feature selection
mechanism as implemented in Weka (this mechanism is also based on gain ratio).
In light of the second observation above, we answer RQ2 by measuring the over-
all importance of the features across all the classifiers. To do so, we first aggregated
the top five most important features based on the rankings obtained from the different
classifiers. We then computed the importance of a set F of features of the same type
(e.g., vulnerability features: V1 to V154 in Table 1) as the percentage of the number of
classifiers having some feature of F in their top five most important features. Table 3
shows the results. For example, all (100%) of the classifiers have some vulnerability in
their top five most important features. The domain experts in our study stated that the
results of Table 3 were consistent with their intuition about the most important factors
in determining the relevance of ISO controls.
Table 3. Most important features for ISO-control classification.
Vulnerability Risk # of assets
per category
Threat
impact
Threat Security
answer
# of critical
assets
100% 62.80% 16.00% 15.38% 12.80% 2.50% 1.20%
The answer to RQ2 is that overall and in descending order of magnitude, vulnerabili-
ties, risks, the number of assets per category, threat impacts, threats, security answers,
and the number of critical assets are the most influential feature groups. This finding
is consistent with the intuition of the security specialists in our case study.
6.3 RQ3
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Figure 4 summarizes through a boxplot the
results of EXPIII, described in Section 5.4.
Specifically, the boxplot shows the distribu-
tions of precision, Pp, and recall, Rp, as de-
fined in Section 5.5. On average, our ap-
proach has a recall of 94.85% and precision
of 67.38% when tasked with identifying the
ISO controls relevant to a given project. The
high recall suggests that the analysts can fo-
cus most of their attention on the recom-
mended ISO controls, since the recommenda-
tions most likely contain all the relevant con-
trols. The precision is reasonable too: On average, our approach recommends 9.4 ISO
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Fig. 5. Recall values of the ISO classifiers.
controls – both true and false positives – for a project. Of these, one can expect an aver-
age of 6.3 recommendations to be correct and 3.1 to be incorrect. The domain experts in
our study confirmed that, given the small number of recommended ISO controls, they
can vet the validity of the recommendations efficiently.
From Figure 4, we further observe that the recall (Rp) for eight out of the total of 227
projects in our dataset is below 75%. Upon a follow-up investigation, we determined
that the root cause for low recall in these projects is that the majority (and in two cases,
all) of the ISO controls relevant to these projects have low prevalence in the dataset. In
Figure 5, we plot the recall of each ISO-control classifier (Rc) against the prevalence of
the respective ISO control in the dataset. The ten datapoints encircled by  represent
the ISO controls that bring about low recall in the above-mentioned eight projects.
A complementary insight from Figure 4 is that recall is highly stable for those ISO
controls that occur≥ 15 in our dataset. As noted previously, handling less frequent ISO
controls requires complementary techniques and is the subject of future work.
With regard to execution time, we make the following remarks: Generating J48 clas-
sification models for all the ISO controls subject to our experiments took 215 seconds
in total; this gives an average training time of 2.8 seconds per ISO control. With the
classifiers built, issuing recommendations for a given project takes an average of 1.7
seconds. These results suggest that our approach is scalable.
The answer to RQ3 is that, based on our case study results, our approach shows
promise in terms of usefulness. In particular, our approach has a high recall (94.85%)
and acceptable precision (67.38%) in identifying the ISO controls relevant to a se-
curity assessment project. Further, the execution times for training and classification
are small. This suggests that our approach will scale to larger datasets.
7 Threats to Validity
The validity considerations most relevant to our work are construct and external validity,
as we discuss below.
Construct validity: Our evaluation metrics are scoped to the security controls for which
there are at least five occurrences in the historical data. Below this threshold, applying
ML is unlikely to be meaningful. Our evaluation examines whether ML is a suitable
technique for our analytical purpose only when ML is applicable. Other techniques –
not explored in this paper – are required for dealing with the security controls to which
ML cannot be meaningfully applied.
External validity: Generalizability is an important concern for any single case study,
including the one in this paper. While the historical information we draw on for learning
is aligned with commonly used ISO standards and is thus representative of a broader
set of security assessment practices in industry, additional case studies are essential for
examining whether our approach remains effective in other application contexts. In par-
ticular, the nature and source of security controls in other contexts and how accurately
the pertinence of these controls can be determined through automation requires further
investigation.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an approach based on machine learning for assisting ana-
lysts with the task of deciding what security controls are relevant to a given system
and context. This task is an important prerequisite for the proper elaboration of secu-
rity requirements in the early stages of development. We evaluated our approach using
real security assessment data from the banking domain. The results suggest that our
approach provides effective decision support for security controls whose application is
not too rare in the existing data. For these controls, our approach yielded an average
recall of ≈ 95% and average precision of ≈ 67%. As far as we are aware, we are the
first to have applied machine learning for supporting the selection of security controls.
In the future, we would like to study whether complementary techniques such as
case-based reasoning can be utilized for handling security controls with too few occur-
rences in the existing data. Another important future direction is to provide decision
support for the identification of threats and vulnerabilities. Broadening our approach to
cover these aspects requires going beyond the structured assessment information that is
stored according to a pre-defined schema. In particular, we will need to additionally con-
sider and extract security-related information from textual development artifacts, e.g.,
system and asset descriptions. Finally, we would like to conduct a qualitative evalua-
tion of the interpretable machine-learning models in our current case study, and further
perform new case studies to investigate the usefulness of our approach in domains other
than banking.
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